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Fresh produce suppliers in Europe and the United States use a mix of price and non-price marketing strategies. This 
paper shows that these strategies create, using Mancur Olson’s terms, two collective goods: overall consumer confidence 
in the market’s ability to deliver credence attributes, and overall consumer satisfaction with the experience attributes of 
fresh produce. The characteristics of these two collective goods, i.e., their compatible use and high costs of exclusion, 
influence the costs, effectiveness, and nature of the marketing strategies of firms. This paper presents examples from 
the fresh produce industries of Europe and the U.S. to show how compatible-use and high-exclusion costs influence 
firm strategies. It concludes that there are unavoidable interdependencies that create a need for collective action—a 
need that will increase as consumer and retailer demand for quality attributes in fresh produce increases.
for creating and monitoring country-of-origin labels 
and eco-labels are effective. Consumer satisfaction 
comprises the perceptions and expectations of a 
consumer for experience attributes such as taste, 
juiciness, texture, and “eating pleasure.” When we 
write “overall level” of, for instance, satisfaction, 
we mean the distribution of a given perception over 
consumers in a given market. 
Most research on non-price product attributes and 
their influence on consumer perceptions has focused 
on how specific strategies can be implemented by 
businesses or government. For example, Baker 
(1998) notes that to build consumer confidence in 
produce safety (a credence attribute) governments 
can use production standards, regulatory monitor-
ing, and government-defined labels and industry 
can use grower, retailer, and third-party labels. 
Other research has examined the complementar-
ity of industry and government strategies. Several 
studies analyzed the effectiveness of government 
monitoring to assure credibility and consumer con-
fidence in industry signals for credence attributes, in 
particular food safety and environment (Baines and 
Davis 1997; Northern and Henson 1999; Unnevehr, 
Miller, and Gòmez 1999; Valceschini 1999). 
Most of the latter studies on the optimal choice 
of quality signals do not treat the interdependencies 
that can exist between individual quality signals and 
the collective goods that are affected by individual 
signals, such as overall consumer confidence (in 
produce safety, particularly) and overall consumer 
satisfaction (from organoleptic quality). 
The problem of overall consumer confidence 
in produce safety, independent of any particular 
signal of quality, is a real problem that is measured 
in several industry “barometers” such as the Euro-
Suppliers for the fresh produce markets of Europe 
and the United States use a mix of price and non-
price marketing strategies. These strategies high-
light fresh produce attributes, some of which the 
consumer can observe at the time of purchase (such 
as price) and some of which the consumer can only 
observe at the time of consumption (taste); others 
are not readily discernable by the consumer (such as 
production origin). These are referred to as search, 
experience, and credence attributes (Nelson 1970; 
Darby and Karni 1973; Tirole 1988).1 
Non-price marketing strategies influence con-
sumer perceptions and attitudes. Strategies that 
highlight experience attributes will influence the 
consumer’s satisfaction with fresh produce, and 
those that highlight credence attributes will influ-
ence the confidence of the consumer in the credibil-
ity of the safety claims made about fresh produce. 
Consumer confidence is trust that desired credence 
attributes are present in their produce—e.g., if a 
label on an apple says “produced in France” or 
“green,” that the product is indeed from France or 
is “environmentally friendly” and that the systems 
1 Other search attributes for fresh produce are related to the 
external “quality” such as firmness, size, shape, color, scent/
smell, and blemishes. Other experience attributes include 
crispness, moisture content, and internal condition. Other 
credence attributes include sanitary (e.g., pesticide residue or 
presence of harmful pathogens), health (e.g., vitamin content), 
environmental (e.g., “green” growing techniques/conditions), 
and social (e.g., labor standards, ethical and fair trade).
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barometer2 as well as continual surveys of consum-
ers, for example by The Packer3. In the literature, 
this problem is generally approached as an issue of 
enforcement of standards by governments—apply-
ing standards that are already “givens,” standards 
supposedly already accepted by suppliers and 
consumers. In the context of globalization and the 
development of private standards, the issue of assur-
ing the consumer of produce safety becomes more 
complex; standards can no longer be assumed to be 
“givens” and must be considered as endogenous in 
the analysis. Problems of enforcement as well as 
definition have to be considered simultaneously. 
The problem of assuring the confidence of the 
consumer can be posed as a problem of collective 
action for the definition of as well as the enforce-
ment of standards, for the production of a collective 
good called “overall consumer confidence.”
Treatment in the literature of consumer taste sat-
isfaction for a generic produce item is quite specific 
to produce categories with weak branding. In the 
categories with strong branding, in clearly segment-
ed markets, the problem of consumer satisfaction 
is the responsibility of suppliers and retailers mar-
keting the private brands (Klein and Leffler 1981; 
Tirole 1988; Kapferer and Thoenig 1989; Aacker 
and Joachimsthaler 2002). In the weakly branded 
categories, by contrast, there is a need for signals 
other than private brands, as the latter are very weak 
or non-existent. It is in those categories, with a lack 
of clear and strong quality signals, that the taste 
reputation of the generic produce item continues 
to play a major role. In these categories, two col-
lective goods are relevant: overall satisfaction (the 
taste reputation of the generic product) and overall 
confidence (the safety reputation of the generic 
product).
Two categories of produce experience difficulties 
in establishing private brands with a high degree of 
visibility for the consumer: location-specific prod-
ucts that have many private brands but which brands 
are weak and with low-visibility for the consumer 
(wines, local artisan cheeses, artisan sausage, etc.)4 
and fresh products with very little or no branding 
(fruits and vegetables, beef, pork, fresh fish, etc.). 
Among these, fresh fruits and vegetables (FFV) are 
without doubt the category that most suffers from 
the dual problem of production of collective goods 
(of confidence and satisfaction). FFV are charac-
terized by the near absence of brands5,6 visible to 
the consumer (Codron, Giraud-Heraud, and Soler 
2003), by the centrality of taste-quality and safety 
(pesticide residuals) in consumer choice, and by a 
large number of individual-firm quality strategies, 
relatively lightly regulated by government (Codron 
et al. 2003). 
The case of FFV thus allows us to examine issues 
related to joint management of the two collective 
goods discussed above (confidence and satisfaction) 
and to address several questions rarely addressed 
in the literature. 
  First, the literature has rarely examined the 
effects of the “aggregate” of consumer attitudes 
toward the produce market on strategies of par-
ticular firms, yet one would expect such widely 
held attitudes to be fundamental conditioners of 
such strategies. 
  Second, the literature has rarely examined how 
the marketing strategies of individual firms affect 
overall levels of consumer confidence and satis-
faction in the produce market. This is potentially 
2 The European Commission sponsors consumer studies that 
measure overall consumer feelings (e.g., Eurobarometre 49) 
across products and across institutions for each EU country. 
Products with least consumer confidence, listed from least to 
most confidence, are meat, fish, eggs, vegetables, fruit, milk, 
cheeses, and bread. Consumers in different countries have 
different levels of confidence in the assurance of food safety 
by government, retailers, or producers. 
3 The Packer sponsors an annual consumer survey and 
sometimes reports on general levels of consumer feelings 
(e.g., both Fresh Trends 2002 and 1998 discuss the effects 
of food-safety concerns on consumer confidence in produce 
markets).
4 Gergaud and Vignes (2000) and Lange et al. (2002) examine 
the relationships among price, quality, and reputation. They 
find that “objective” quality is appreciated only by “experts” 
and that average consumers (with little specific education 
concerning quality appreciation for the product in question) 
tend to base their purchasing behavior on reputation rather 
than on some objective quality characteristics.
5 The reason the fresh produce market lacks (in general, 
with some differences over countries) dominant brands is 
because fresh produce’s natural variability and perishability 
make difficult the consistent delivery of a set of search and 
experience attributes, and without consistency a brand loses 
its marketing effectiveness. The same difficulty is faced by 
countries or regions, given the great variability of produce 
quality across farms in the country or region.
6 However, there tends to be a relatively greater presence 
of these labels in the U.S. as compared to France (with the 
presence of labels of large firms such as Dole and Sunkist 
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important in the produce market because there is 
evidence from other markets—such as for cattle 
feed—that negligence by a particular firm has 
spoiled overall consumer confidence in the meat 
market. 
  Third, the literature has rarely examined the 
relationship between the two efforts of collective 
action to produce the two collective goods (satisfac-
tion and confidence)—or that those two objectives 
can potentially conflict. 
  Given the above gaps, we address via the 
presentation of a conceptual analysis with empiri-
cal illustrations the following questions: (1) How 
can overall consumer confidence and satisfaction 
influence the nature, effectiveness, and cost of a 
particular produce firm’s marketing strategies? (2) 
What is the relationship between overall consumer 
confidence and overall consumer satisfaction in pro-
duce markets?
This paper first specifies the characteristics of 
consumer confidence and satisfaction and poses 
two research questions. Next, a set of definitions 
is provided to clearly delineate proposed relation-
ships, and examples are drawn from European and 
U.S. fresh produce markets. Finally, the paper ex-
amines the challenges that the interdependencies 
between “consumer satisfaction” and “consumer 
confidence,” have for marketing strategies.
Conceptual Framework and Hypotheses 
Overall confidence and satisfaction are “collective 
goods” in that each has high exclusion costs and 
is compatible in use—the costs of excluding oth-
ers from the benefits of the provision of this good 
are high. If a firm takes an action to raise overall 
consumer confidence (for example, advertising 
regarding blueberries’ health benefits), that firm 
would not be able to exclude other firms from also 
benefiting from the ensuing greater consumer con-
fidence and preference for the product. Moreover, 
consumer confidence, as a “collective good,” is used 
but not consumed, and thus other firms can “use” 
the overall level of consumer confidence without 
reducing the stock available for use by the invest-
ing firm.7 The same explanation can be given for 
“overall consumer satisfaction.” 
There are incentives in the produce market for 
the under-supply of such collective good, and hence 
our hypothesis is that there is insufficient invest-
ment by individual produce suppliers in inducing 
the development of such goods. The collective, 
compatible-in-use nature of overall consumer 
confidence in and satisfaction with produce means 
firms working individually have little incentive for 
unilateral investments. The investment in one good 
might reduce another, hence there are tradeoffs in 
the supply of these collective goods. For example, 
stricter pesticide regulations may make an apple 
consumer feel safer but also less pleased with the 
insect-damaged fruit.
Insufficient levels of the collective good of con-
sumer confidence and satisfaction in the market do 
however, have consequences for firms, as that adds 
costs to and reduces the effectiveness of individual 
marketing efforts by produce firms. 
The above implies that rather than going it alone, 
produce firms are inter-dependent and have an in-
centive to collective action to promote overall con-
sumer confidence and satisfaction. However, that 
incentive is counterbalanced by several costs: the 
costs of specifying a product attribute, i.e., “defini-
tion costs” (for example, the cost of adding a label 
specifying “vine-ripened” or “brix/sugar level”), 
and the costs of enforcing the chosen specification, 
i.e., “enforcement costs.” These costs, their relation 
to overall consumer confidence and satisfaction, 
and how they affect firms’ marketing strategies, 
are treated in the next two sections.
The Characteristics of Consumer Confidence: 
Challenges Posed to Marketing Strategies
Consumer Confidence and Definition Costs
Definition costs are significant where suppliers do 
not agree on a standard for a given attribute of a 
product. That disagreement is sometimes driven by 
disagreement among outside experts. This is the 
case for food safety in various produce items where 
there is often a lack of consensus regarding various 
credence attributes such as risk level, as well as 
how to manage and communicate risk. Even were 
7 Schmid (1987) distinguishes “incompatible use” goods, 
used in most standard economic models (e.g., if A eats an apple, 
B cannot eat the same apple—A’s consumption of the apple 
is incompatible with B also consuming it), from “compatible
in use” goods, which are used but not consumed (used up). 
Schmid refers to these as “joint impact” goods and notes that 
the number of users does not affect the costs of the provision 
of that good, hence for some range of number of users the 
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experts to agree, consumers might not agree with 
the expert consensus—for example, on an accept-
able level of pesticide residue on fruit or whether 
suppliers should communicate to consumers (via 
labels) whether the fruit has pesticide residues (even 
when those residues are very slight and considered 
“safe” by scientific/medical standards). 
How do definition costs influence the effective-
ness, cost, and nature of individual supplier’s mar-
keting strategies? High definition costs are associ-
ated with ambiguity and uncertainty in standards, 
which in turn undermines overall consumer confi-
dence. If no single firm can impose its definition 
upon the market, and suppliers as a group cannot 
come to consensus—for example, about what level 
pesticides is safe—then every firm will be forced 
to choose a “negligible risk” and communicate it to 
the consumer. But that variation across firms will 
undermine consumer confidence (i.e., the provision 
of that collective good). 
The under-provision of a collective good is 
usually considered a justification for government 
intervention into the market. When no market-
standard definition for a credence attribute exists 
the government can specify the definition through 
rules, such as codes of practice or maximum residue 
levels. This reduces consumers’ uncertainty about 
standards and raises overall consumer confidence. 
For example, in the past several decades most U.S. 
consumers assumed that the federal government had 
taken actions to guarantee a “safe” food supply. Pro-
duce suppliers thus did not feel the need to develop 
and communicate a definition of the “safeness” of 
their fresh produce. If there were a reduction in 
U.S. consumer confidence of the degree to which 
government can guarantee the safety of food, either 
produce firms would need to collectively negotiate 
a market consensus of “safe” or each firm would 
need to develop its own definition. The latter is 
the case for Carrefour in France, which forbids all 
post-harvest chemical treatment in its private-label 
apples. 
Another dimension of standard-definition cost 
is where a firm uses marketing and advertising to 
differentiate its product from its competitors’ by 
saying that it is higher quality or safer than that 
of others. That action may differ from industry 
informal norms of behavior, make consumers 
aware of an issue they had not recognized before, 
and cause consumers to have lower confidence in 
the products of the other suppliers. An illustration 
is banana and pineapple plantation labor condi-
tions. In the 1990s activists in the U.S. and Europe 
raised concerns over labor rights and conditions in 
developing countries. That induced the creation of 
an international standard for social accountability, 
SA 8000. Several European tropical fruit suppliers 
and retailers sought SA 8000 certification for their 
plantation crops and began using this certification as 
a marketing strategy for market-differentiation. This 
awoke consumers’ awareness of labor conditions, 
as the logical implication was that certification of 
one set of suppliers as being fair to their workers 
meant that the complementary set was possibly un-
fair, and thus overall consumer confidence fell. Thus 
by early 2001 most major suppliers of bananas and 
pineapple to Europe were implementing marketing 
strategies to address the issue of ethical treatment 
of workers.
A final dimension of standard-definition costs 
is the congestion that arises from too many users 
of a compatible-use good, the use-compatibility of 
which is limited over some range of use. Beyond 
some point, congestion occurs and additional us-
ers inhibit the availability of the good. With fresh 
produce, there is a potential limit to the number 
of signals (e.g., brands, labels, certificates, code 
words) that consumers will find useful. Hence, for 
any given credence attribute, too many marketing 
signals leave consumers confused about which 
signals mean what, and this may ultimately reduce 
overall confidence.8 
An example of congestion is the development of 
the organic label in the U.S. over the past 20 years. 
In the absence of consensus on the term “organic,” 
many firms developed their own strategies, some 
unique to a firm, some as collective actions based on 
shared certification and labeling programs. By 2000 
there were many certification programs, labels, and 
operative definitions of “organic” in the U.S. This 
was confusing for consumers and hurt overall con-
fidence in organic produce. The U.S. government 
responded by establishing minimum standards for 
organic labeling. This sent a signal to consumers, 
assuring them that the term “organic” now had a 
8 For example, Baines and Davis (1997) note that a 
proliferation of food-retailer and farm-assurance schemes in the 
U.K. resulted in the industry and consumers being confused as 
to what was being assured and by whom. Also, Teisl, Roe, and 
Levy (1999) suggest that “the proliferation of voluntary eco-
labeling programs may actually increase consumer confusion 
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consistent, standard definition that was backed by 
the federal government. This improved overall con-
sumer confidence, which through greater demand 
and lower expenditures on communication to con-
sumers benefited even firms that disagreed with the 
government’s definition. Another example of con-
gestion is the proliferation of claims of “reasonable 
agriculture” (“agriculture raisonnée,” a term used in 
France for reduced pesticide use in farming, an in-
termediate level between organic and conventional) 
on agricultural products and in particular on produce 
occurred in the 1990s in France. To avoid confusing 
the consumer and the use of abusive advertising by 
the private sector, the government regulated suppli-
ers’ communication to consumers with regard to, 
as well as the rules concerning farms’ qualification 
for, “l’agriculture raisonnée.” For produce sold in 
the European market, however, national regulations 
with respect to this communication to consumers 
loses much of its effect and force, becoming merely 
one among many. 
Either collective action or the exercise of mar-
ket or political power can resolve congestion and 
determine how many and which signals should be 
allowed to be given in the market and whether the 
limits should be voluntary (self-imposed by the col-
lective) or mandated by the government.
Consumer Confidence and Enforcement Costs
Enforcement costs are incurred implementing stan-
dards designed to either maintain or raise overall 
consumer confidence. These costs are sometimes 
imposed collectively by the actors in the supply 
chain or production zone, such as for HACCP pro-
grams for fresh produce in Europe (Becker 1992; 
Baines, Davis, and Ryan 2000).9 However, without 
government or third-party monitoring or certifica-
tion, a firm has the incentive to free-ride on the 
increased overall consumer confidence in produce 
safety, without incurring the costs of implementing 
HACCP. This is the case for produce, while in the 
meat and fish sector these standards are mandatory 
and monitored and enforced by government.
The French government labeled fruit with “safe 
pesticide residue levels” to enforce an existing 
standard definition and maintain (as opposed to 
attempting to raise) overall consumer confidence. 
It also prohibits any marketing practices that might 
erode confidence in that standard definition: it is 
illegal for French fresh produce marketers to ad-
vertise that produce has a pesticide residue level 
below that legally permitted, even if their residue 
levels are lower. Thus the government incurs the 
enforcement costs by monitoring actual pesticide 
levels, restricting communication to consumers, and 
banning some forms of product differentiation that 
might erode confidence in the existing definition of 
“safe” fresh produce.
Several examples are noted here of successful 
collective action to gain and maintain the confi-
dence of the consumer when that confidence is put 
in danger by the media communicating information 
to the public pell-mell. 
“Crisis units” were formed by organizations of 
producers, with the help of the French government, 
to respond quickly when information that might 
panic consumers is spread by the media. Moreover, 
a growing number of states in the U.S. are enacting 
anti-defamation laws to protect food suppliers. In 
12 states, including Arizona and Florida, whoever 
makes a public allegation of problems with perish-
able food products must now show scientific proof 
of the problem or face payment of damages to the 
supplier. 
Collective action with a diverse set of actors, 
including public authorities, is also possible. For 
instance, a serious problem, able to undermine the 
image of produce’s healthiness, was discovered in 
1981 when imported rapeseed oil was blamed by the 
media for leaving more than 1000 dead and some 
25,000 ill. However, Woffinden (2001) reported 
that the fatalities and illnesses were instead due to 
large doses of organophosphates on tomatoes from 
Almeria in Southern Spain. Competing countries 
could profit from such a threat by differentiating 
their product by country of origin. However, they 
did not do so for two reasons. First, claiming dif-
ferences in country of origin to assert that local 
products are safer is dangerous, essentially because 
annual reports on the public control of the label of 
origin keep showing many irregularities. Second, 
the national fresh produce industry cannot be sure 
their members have greater integrity. Hence, instead 
of profiting from the crisis, private and public actors 
behaved as if there were a collective agreement to 
say nothing about the problem. An illustration is 
given by Woffinden (2001): 
9 HACCP is “hazard analysis and critical control points,” a 
process-focused approach to enhance safety and record keeping 
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The weekly magazine Der Spiegel recently re-
vealed an internal note of the German govern-
ment. According to the document, the analysis 
of imported food products showed that certain 
fruits and vegetables coming from Spain still 
contain dangerous doses of pesticides. Several 
sweet peppers appear to have been “highly 
contaminated” and the chemical residues 
attained “levels that we can no longer toler-
ate.” But the last line of the note is the most 
eloquent: “In no case should this information 
be made known to the public.”
The Characteristics of Consumer Satisfaction: 
Challenges Posed to Marketing Strategies
In terms of consumer satisfaction (with respect to 
organoleptic attributes), the problem of free riding is 
less marked when the issue is experience attributes 
that each producer can control, as opposed to trust-
related attributes that lead the consumer to seek 
the expertise of various intermediaries (experts, the 
media, the rumor mill, etc.) in order to form his or 
her opinion, all the more because the issues concern 
his or her own health. 
It is certain that the absence of strong branding 
does not facilitate the enforcement of experience 
attributes, and thus leads to substantial measure-
ment costs for consumers, both in the search for a 
reputable retailer, or once in a store, in search of 
a good product. That said, there nevertheless exist 
several reference points (such as the consumer’s 
experience, his or her confidence in the retailer, 
occasional quality signals that may or may not be 
credible) that allow a consumer to reduce measure-
ment costs and rely on market mechanisms that are 
to some extent effective. Thus efforts to sell produce 
of a superior quality are in general rewarded, even 
if the premium obtained is less than the supplier 
could have received were the market more finely 
segmented. These efforts contribute to the improve-
ment of overall consumer satisfaction. Specific 
examples of situations in which special effort and 
success in a given product category actually raises 
the consumer interest in the whole sector are: (a) the 
success of several high-quality products—such as 
Chilean apples in the winter—opened the floodgates 
of consumer desire in the 1980s and early 1990s for 
more off-season fruit; (b) the availability of good-
tasting wines at modest cost from California in the 
Table 1. Summary of the Examples Cited for the Production of “Overall Consumer Confidence.”





Government credibility in 
guaranteeing safety
No need for other definition
Government Safeness/U.S.
Individual retailer defines more 
stringent sanitary standard
Firm Pesticides/France
Preemptive costs Adoption of SA 8000 (social label) 
by multinational bananas exporters
Industry Social /world




HACCP as a voluntary (recom-
mended) standard is more costly to 
enforce; more free riding
Industry Safety/EU
Government forbidding communica-
tion of pesticide-residue levels
Government Pesticide residues/
U.S. and EU
Protection against the media: Crisis 
cells, laws against defamation, 
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1980s initiated a desire in the U.S. for wine and 
opened the door to a proliferation of wine consump-
tion; (c) the success of Vidalia onions opened up 
a proliferation in consumption of numerous onion 
varieties. 
Market mechanisms are, however, limited. They 
do not always allow individual supplier efforts to 
raise quality to be fully rewarded (relative to the 
quality of the experience). There are several cases 
where opportunistic behavior by certain suppliers 
contributes to the degradation of the reputation of 
the generic product. Collective organization then 
becomes necessary to protect the quality reputa-
tion of the product, what we have called overall 
consumer satisfaction. 
Like consumer confidence, overall consumer sat-
isfaction is in some cases compatible in use and has 
high exclusion costs in the produce market—and 
thus maintaining or increasing that satisfaction in-
volves standard-definition and enforcement costs, 
and the consequent level of satisfaction conditions 
the effectiveness and nature of firm marketing 
strategies. 
Consumer Satisfaction and Definition Costs
Ripeness, flavor, shelf-life, and sugar content are 
closely related to the date of harvest for many types 
of fresh produce, but there are often substantial 
profits to be made by the firm that is first on the 
market. This creates an incentive to harvest early, 
even before full ripeness, but the lack of ripeness 
then leads to the product having poor experience 
attributes, which hurts the reputation of a production 
zone and diminishes overall consumer satisfaction. 
For example, in Italy in 2000, Conerpo, a kiwifruit 
producer, introduced a strict harvesting and export 
timetable to ensure that only fruit with excellent 
experience attributes entered the market. However, 
Conerpo only controlled 15 percent of total Italian 
kiwifruit output. Other producers were asked to 
respect the proposed timetable, but adoption was 
voluntary. Some competitors started exporting six 
weeks ahead of the proposed schedule. Managers at 
Conerpo contend that their efforts to enhance inter-
national consumer satisfaction with Italian kiwifruit 
were undermined by those firms not respecting the 
schedule. Eurofruit Magazine (2000a) reported 
that “there are fears that, if these operators are not 
brought into line, consumers will lose faith in the 
product, damaging the whole industry.” (45).
Some supplier groups have addressed the pre-
mature marketing problem. For example, Chilean 
apple suppliers annually set specific harvest dates 
to be strictly respected by all apple exporters in 
order to maintain a reputation for flavorful apples. 
Note also the current efforts of the peach/nectarine 
subsector in France in the face of a general decline 
in consumer satisfaction that has translated into a 
reduction in consumption. Accords among peach/
nectarine producers and traders were signed several 
years ago to enforce a maximum level of firmness in 
the fruit, and several years later to prohibit the sale 
of small-grade fruit (caliber D entirely, and caliber 
C only at the start of the season) and more recently 
for a minimum level of sugar in the fruit. 
One can also note switching costs from one 
classification system (a set of grades) to another, 
given asset fixity and the inertia created by long 
traditions of given practices. One can, for example, 
consider that the fine segmentation of fruit size, 
color, and even blemishes surely permits logistical 
advantages but can be accomplished at the expense 
of flavor/taste: one can have a segmentation less 
fine and more attention to criteria focused on taste 
(such as the sugar content). There is thus a tradeoff 
between emphasis on standards systems that focus 
on size/color/blemishes and those that focus on 
sugar content and firmness. 
The standards are not the same in all countries, 
and generally favor the visual aspect over the taste 
aspect. For example, “skin russetting” in apples is 
considered in some countries—such as the U.S.—a 
“physiological skin disorder” that reduces the fruit’s 
visual appeal and which in fact stops their sale in 
fresh markets. But in countries like Italy, skin rus-
setting is rather seen as a sign of superior taste qual-
ity (Reganold et al. 2001). Where the competition 
between these two sets of standards takes place on 
the basis of price, one can favor one or the other 
dimension of quality, but the passage from one to 
the other is not quickly done and occasions insti-
tutional costs. 
However, harvest date and location are imperfect 
proxies for fruit sugar content, a major factor in fla-
vor. Devices now exist to measure the sugar content 
of a piece of fruit without damaging or punctur-
ing the fruit.10 This new technology will permit 
10 A device to measure sweetness is called infrared 
spectroscope (NIR). It was first used commercially in Japan, 
but recently has been introduced to U.S. and European markets 
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greater market segmentation based on experience 
attributes. If widely adopted, it will also raise the 
general consumer satisfaction by making it feasible 
and cost-effective to establish industry-wide grades 
and standards for sugar content. At issue will be 
who will determine that standard and how stringent 
it should be, which will imply a trade-off between 
quality reputation and share of output marketed as 
opposed to dumped or sold at a lower price because 
of inadequate sugar content. 
The Washington apple industry provides an 
example where fruit taste was given a back seat to 
fruit appearance in efforts to win consumer satis-
faction. Because of favorable growing conditions, 
Washington Red Delicious apples can be larger and 
redder than the same type of apple from other re-
gions. Over several decades, the Washington apple 
industry adapted its practices and genetic research 
to focus on those two appearance traits, largely ig-
noring flavor, and built a marketing advantage on 
them. Retailers were willing to pay more for apples 
with these traits. The Washington apple industry 
expanded in response to this price incentive and 
eventually became the dominant apple-producing 
region in the U.S. By 2000, however, the overall 
level of consumer satisfaction for Washington Red 
Delicious apples was very low because it was per-
ceived that the apples looked good but tasted me-
diocre, as confirmed by consumer surveys funded 
by the Washington apple industry. 
An analogous problem could occur again today 
if attention lurches the other way, to the sugar level. 
The latter is surely a useful proxy for taste, but 
again, if all effort is focused on favoring the sugar 
level that can itself end up undermining the taste 
of the apple. That would already come close to the 
situation in France where organizations of melon 
producers are adopting new melon varieties which 
allow the farmer to more easily raise the sugar level 
but which do not have the richness of taste of the 
traditional varieties of melon. Consumer panels for 
various types of produce (apple, tomato, melon, and 
others) show that the success in the taste realm de-
pends on a harmonious equilibrium of criteria—not 
just sugar content, but also crunchiness, juiciness, 
aroma, acidity, and so on (Decohene 1998). In 
France, the Interprofessional Technical Center for 
Fruits and Vegetables (CTIFL) is currently working 
on an overall index of quality allowing the aggrega-
tion of the different criteria. Thus far a consensus 
has not been reached on such an index 
Table 2. Summary of the Examples Cited for the Production of “Overall Consumer Satisfaction.”
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More stringent quality standards in the peach sec-
tor affected by a long-term drop in consumption




Priority to experience attributes within cost con-
straint could be achieved through downgrading 
search attributes (color, size)
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Italy, USA
Choice of proxies might backfire in the long run: 
example of brix and color level in apples
Industry Color/sugar and 
taste/US, France
Difficulty in finding a consensus on the definition 




Effectiveness of rules in open markets suggests the 
participation of various competitor countries on the 
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Consumer Satisfaction and Enforcement Costs
The above examples also highlight the importance 
of enforcement costs associated with general 
consumer satisfaction. The efforts noted above 
undertaken in Chile and Italy to try to regulate 
harvest and marketing timetables are vulnerable 
to opportunistic behavior. Monitoring and certify-
ing compliance is possible with either government 
or third-party certification programs, but this kind 
of enforcement of timetables and harvest quality 
can be costly and difficult, and, like the case of 
the promotion of consumer confidence, effective 
collective action by suppliers to promote general 
consumer satisfaction is dependent on the supplier 
group’s ability to establish standard definitions of 
experience attributes and enforce the consensus 
standard. Collective action is made even more 
difficult by the fact that the markets in which it is 
implemented are typically international markets; it 
often happens that an effort is successful in causing 
a standard to be adopted in a national market but 
that the efficacy of this rule or standard is weakened 
by the lack of adherence to the rule or standard in 
competing countries. 
Several years ago the organizations of French 
producers obtained the extension of a rule prohibit-
ing the sale of size C peaches, a small size. Because 
smaller sizes are reputed to be of lower quality than 
the larger sizes, by prohibiting the sale of the small 
peaches the average peach quality and peach price 
are increased on the market. The rule cannot be 
imposed on importing countries, but the French 
organizations are trying to obtain the accord of 
competing countries. Italy has already agreed, but 
Spain has not yet. 
Tradeoffs  in  the  Provision  of  Consumer 
Confidence and Consumer Satisfaction
Is the provision of both consumer confidence and 
consumer satisfaction compatible or a trade-off re-
lationship, and over what range? Several trade-offs 
are evident. First, as noted earlier, less pesticide use 
could increase consumer confidence in the market’s 
ability to supply safe fresh produce but could also 
lead to more insect damage, thus lowering consumer 
satisfaction. 
Second, delaying the harvest of many fruits can 
increase the sugar content of the fruit. But a delayed 
harvest often requires higher levels of pesticide use 
and narrower time gaps between late-season pesti-
cide applications and harvesting. 
Third, market congestion exacerbates the trade-
off, as some firms focus on experience attributes 
while other focus on credence attributes. One can 
imagine a piece of fruit with multiple stickers, 
each one a label for a different attribute (origin, 
environmentally friendly growing conditions, ethi-
cal worker conditions, variety, sugar content, and 
harvest date). Not only will this type of conges-
tion diminish the effectiveness of each label, but 
consumers may also be completely alienated by 
fresh produce covered with stickers. Moreover, 
consumers may not interpret correctly a given 
label. Blend and van Ravenswaay (1998) found 
that 37% of their respondents in a consumer 
study indicated food safety was their first reason 
for buying eco-labeled apples, compared to 27% 
citing environmental concerns first. Similar results 
were found in a 1991 survey of Georgia consum-
ers (Huang 1991). Likewise, researchers in Europe 
have noted that some consumers purchase organic 
foods because they believe that they taste better and 
are more nutritious (Hervieu 2000). But European 
organic labels make no guarantees concerning either 
of these attributes. Such errors in the perceptions 
of consumers can erode both overall consumer 
confidence and consumer satisfaction. 
From a theoretical perspective, it has also been 
shown that an increase in the minimum quality 
standard leads to an increase in the costs of differ-
entiation (Ronnen 1991; Crampes  1995). When the 
increase in the standard concerns a safety standard 
(which is most often the case), this is followed 
by a narrowing of the options to increase quality, 
particularly with respect to taste—and hence there 
is a safety/quality tradeoff. That is one reason why 
certain supermarket chains in Europe have hesitated 
to adopted the EUREPGAP standard, which is ba-
sically focused on safety and environmental qual-
ity—the adoption of that demanding standard may 
well be at the expense of efforts aimed at raising 
quality, particularly produce taste. Retailers cannot 
charge consumers a price premium for a product 
meeting the EUREPGAP standard, and thus the 
added cost engendered by meeting the standard 
forces producers to economize on production costs 
aimed at other attributes. 
An example is the case of beef, where the formu-
lation of a minimum safety standard after the mad-
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Giraud-Heraud, Rouached, and Soler (2003) use a 
simulation model to show that with a more strin-
gent safety standard the costs of differentiation rise, 
which takes place in particular at the expense of 
taste quality of the beef. 
The tradeoffs imply an incompatible use in the 
composition of the final bundle of attributes of fresh 
produce. A choice of one good cannot be made in-
dependent of the choice of the other. It then is an 
empirical question to determine which choice was 
made and by whom. 
There exist, however, complementarities between 
the two goods: it has been shown that Good Agri-
cultural Practices based on Integrated Crop Man-
agement help the environment, food safety, and the 
taste of produce (Codron et al. 2003), in particular 
due to better irrigation water management. 
Reganold et al. (2001) report the sustainability 
of organic, conventional, and integrated apple-pro-
duction systems in Washington State from 1994 to 
1999. To be sustainable, a farm must produce ad-
equate yields of high quality, be profitable, protect 
the environment, conserve resources, and be so-
cially responsible in the long term. They found that 
fruit damage due to other physiological disorders, 
pests, and diseases were minimal and equal for each 
of the three systems. All three systems gave similar 
apple yields. The organic and integrated systems 
had higher soil quality and potentially lower nega-
tive environmental impact than the conventional 
system. When compared to the conventional and 
integrated systems, the organic system produced 
sweeter and less-tart apples, higher profitability and 
greater energy efficiency. Their data indicate that 
the organic system ranked first in environmental 
and economic sustainability, the integrated system 
second and the conventional system last.
Strategic Options for Providing Credence and 
Experience Attributes
The observations and examples presented in this 
paper demonstrate that individual firm strategies are 
also a part of an interdependent process. As firms try 
to create proprietary levels of consumer confidence 
and satisfaction associated with their own produce, 
their efforts will influence and be influenced by the 
prevailing overall level of market-wide consumer 
confidence in and satisfaction with a fresh produce 
product category. This is the inevitable consequence 
of the high exclusion costs and compatible use of 
the overall levels of consumer confidence and sat-
isfaction.
An implication of these interdependencies is that 
they must be resolved, i.e., choices must be made 
about how credence and experience attributes will 
be marketed. One alternative for providing col-
lective goods is collective action. The alternative, 
where each firm pursues its own strategy, will only 
increase the costs and diminish the effectiveness of 
these individual strategies.
A fragmented subsector increases costs, and this 
is exacerbated when the supply chain is interna-
tional. Collective action can be led by a “channel 
captain.” Earlier studies showed that sometimes the 
costs of collective action are incurred by a single 
actor or a small number of actors that are large-scale 
suppliers, and taking into account the risks of reduc-
tion of consumer confidence, pay all of the cost of 
action. Traditionally the government has assumed 
this cost, while recently supermarket chains—as in 
the case of EUREPGAP or the Global Food Safety 
Initiative of CIES—and large-scale processors, such 
as Nestle, who, by its promotion of natural fruit 
yogurts reinforced the consumers’ appreciation of 
“natural and flavorful” fruit, have also undertaken 
these costs. The suppliers themselves typically do 
not have budgets for generic promotion of fruit. 
Since market trends in both the U.S. and Europe 
clearly indicate that there will be more rather than 
less emphasis on credence and experience attributes 
by consumers, more research is needed in identi-
fying and quantifying the trade-offs of marketing 
multiple attributes, some with conflicting outcomes. 
This is especially true since suppliers, in response to 
perceived consumer demand for “quality” attributes 
in fresh produce, are striving not only to increase 
their market share but also to gain a price premium 
for their differentiated fresh produce. What is still 
unknown is the degree to which consumers will 
tolerate a fragmentation of fresh produce product 
categories into multiple niche markets that target a 
wide range of combinations of numerous credence 
and experience attributes that are already being de-
livered to the market in an evolving, hodge-podge 
manner.
One can also say that despite the need to de-
velop two collective goods—“satisfaction” and 
confidence”—collective action must not restrict the 
individual strategies of differentiation of supplier. 
That is because the latter can also have positive 
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and can be sources of innovation. This is true in 
particular with respect to experience attributes such 
as superior quality. We have seen, in the case of 
Nature’s Choice of Tesco, that an individual firm’s 
strategy to gain consumer confidence, can, under 
certain conditions, push others to follow suit. 
It is nevertheless true that the near absence of 
brands or other collective signals with astrong 
reputation for the consumer obliges suppliers and 
retailers to protect the collective goods which form 
the reputation of the products from the perspective 
of taste (hence satisfaction) and food safety and en-
vironmental protection (hence confidence) against 
the behavior of free-riding. 
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